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Summary findings
Dollar and Easterly's study of aid, investment, and  *  These three conclusions imply that societies
policies in Africa leads them to four principal  themselves must take the lead in putting growth-
conclusions:  enhancing policies in place. When this happens, foreign
* The traditional  links between aid, investment, and  aid can play a powerful supporting role, bringing ideas,
growth  are not robust. Aid does not necessarily finance  technical assistance, and money. The combination of
investment and investment does not necessarily promote  private investment, good policies, and foreign aid is quite
growth.  powerful.
* Differences in economic policies can explain much  Where do we stand in the search for the key to growth
of the difference in growth performance. Poor quality of  in Africa? Because past "keys" to growth  in Africa have
public services, closed trade regimes, financial repression,  failed, Dollar and Easterly are cautious about claims to a
and macroeconomic mismanagement explain Africa's  new key. But even if aid-cum-private-investment-cum-
poor record.  policy reform falls short of being the one and only key to
* Foreign aid cannot easily promote  lasting policy  growth, disbursing aid into good policy environments
reform in countries where there is no strong domestic  would be an improvement on current practices.
movement in that direction. Country ownership of
reform is more important than donor  conditionality.
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' Preliminary  version.  Views  expressed  here are not to be taken as those of the World  Bank or its member
governnents.  Comments  welcome.Development  economists  have made  many attempts  to find the key to growth  in
Africa.  Paging  through  a bibliography  on Africa,  it is evident  that economists  have  not
yet found that key. One finds  titles in a bibliography  like Economic  Crisis in Africa, The
Destruction  of a Continent,  The  Crisis and Challenge  of African Development,  Africa in
Economic  Crisis,  Africa:  Dimensions  of the Economic  Crisis,  Africa's Growth  Tragedy,
The Vampire  State in Africa, The Open  Sore of a Continent,  Africa in Chaos,  and  Africa:
What  Can Be Done?' Since  we development  economists  continue  writing  these articles
and books, it is obvious  that past keys have  not yet unlocked  Africa's potential  for
growth.
In this paper, we review  some  of the keys that  have not worked  and offer pointers
towards  more effective  strategy.  We do not think that there is one key to growth,  but we
think there is evidence  that some strategies  work better  than  others. We want to review
the past intellectual  history of "keys to growth"  because  it induces  humility  about current
"keys to growth",  because  it clarifies  what mistakes  donors  and government  should  not
repeat, and because  old ideas  keep resurfacing.
We see two main phases  of the search  for the key to growth. The first stressed
aid-financed  investment  as the key to unlock  Africa's development  potential. The second
stressed  aid-induced  policy reform  as the key. Neither  key worked,  as we will see in this
paper,  because aid neither increased  investment  nor induced  policy reform. The first key
also failed  because  investment  did not have a tight link to growth  in the short run, and not
even  much of a link in the long run in Africa. Policy,  in contrast,  did have a large effect
on growth,  but aid did not systematically  lead to policy  reform. In the third section  of the
paper  we present  evidence  that the combination  of good  policy and foreign  aid has beeneffective  at promoting  efficient  investment  and growth. Thus, donors  should  target
foreign  aid to good policy  environments  if aid is to be effective  in promoting
development  in Africa.
I. Aid-financed  Investment
The initial attempt  to induce  development  in Africa (and elsewhere)  followed  a
very simple  formula. Economists  suggested  that growth  was proportional  to investment,
by a constant  that was the reciprocal  of what economists  called  the Incremental  Capital
Output Ratio (ICOR).  Investment  was low  because  of low domestic  savings in Africa,  but
aid donors  could finance  additional  investment.  Increasing  aid financing  would increase
investment,  which would  increase  growth.  Donors  added  conditionality  that additional
domestic  saving  would  match aid increases,  making  possible  an even more than  one for
one increase  in investment  when  aid increased.
Vestiges of old  "keys to growth"
Seeing  whether  these predictions  came  true is not only of historical  interest.
Vestiges  of this approach,  which  development  economists  variously  called  the Harrod-
Domar  model,  the Two-Gap  model,  and the financing  requirements  model, remain  in
current  development  practice  in Africa  and elsewhere.  We will call it the aid-financed
investment  approach  to development.  While  this approach  is nowhere  near  as influential
as it was in the 1960s,  the same  aid-to-investment-to-growth  language  continues  to crop
up today.  It is quite possible  that these expressions  of the aid-to-investment-to-growth
dogma  are  pro forma and not taken seriously  in practice. Yet, in any event report-writers
continue  to use this language.  This suggests  that applied  development  economists  have
not yet found a fully satisfactory  replacement  for the aid-financed  investment  paradigm.
2For example,  a 1993  report on Zambia  stated "it is often  thought  to require
investment  of at least 20 percent of GDP  to achieve  output  growth  of 5 percent  (an ICOR
of 4)  .... 2 The 1996  report on Zambia  reiterated  that "a useful (if simplistic)  tool for
comparing  growth and investment  scenarios  across  countries  is an ICOR," since  the
ICOR  reflects the "dependence  of continued  growth  on new investment." 3 The report sets
the non-mining  ICOR at 4 in Zambia.  In Zimbabwe,  the ICOR of 4 pops up again: "With
improved  efficiency,  which  would  reduce  the incremental  capital-to-output  ratio to about
4, growth  could exceed 5% p.a. without  a further  rise in investment  as a share  of GDP."'
(By the way, Easterly 1997  demonstrates  theoretically  that the ICOR is a measure  of
physical  capital  intensity,  not efficiency  of investment.)
Going further  afield from Africa,  a report in 1995  told Latin  Americans  that
"enhancing  savings  and investment  by 8 percentage  points of GDP would  raise the annual
growth  figure by around 2 percentage  points"' (again  an ICOR of 4). Another  report
warned the ex-Communist  countries  that "investment  finance  of the order  of 20 percent
or more  of GDP will be required"  to reach "growth  rates  of 5 percent"  (yet another  ICOR
of 4). This report  on the ex-Communist  economies  noted  that "conditional  official
assistance ... contributes to cover the gap between domestic savings and investment." 6
The expressions  of confidence  in a short-run  to medium-run  relationship  between
aid, investment,  and growth  are still surprisingly  widespread,  especially  in work  on
Africa.  "Africa's economic  performance  is expected  to improve  in 1992-93,"  but the
improvement in these two years hinges on -- among other things -- "the increase in
investment  that is needed  to promote  economic  growth." 7 As another  source  puts it, "The
adjustment  experience  of sub-Saharan  Africa has demonstrated  that to achieve  gains  in
3real per capita GDP an expansion  in private saving  and investment  is key." 8 For Africa,
"official  financing  on concessional  terms will be necessary,"  even  if not sufficient,  "to
improve  growth  prospects." 9
Getting  down to individual  countries,  a 1996  report on Uganda  argued  any aid
reduction  "could  be harmful  for medium-term  growth  in Uganda,  which requires  external
inflows..."'" A 1997  report called "Accelerating  Malawi's Growth"  said that "Different
growth  rates have different  implications".  The optimistic  scenario  required  investment  of
"24% of GDP by the end of the period."  A less  optimistic  growth  scenario  would  imply
"an investment  rate of around  20%."" In a 1995  report  on Madagascar,  concessional
"external  debt would increase significantly ... to modernize and expand Madagascar's
aging plant and equipment and weak infrastructure."" 2
The inventors  of the aid-financed  investment  key in the 1950s  and 1960s  had
confidence  in two short to medium  run links:  the link between  aid and investment,  and
between investment  and growth. We can test empirically  how well these links held in
Africa.
Testing the aid-financed investment approach
We perform  two simple  exercises  for African  countries:  we regress  investment  on
aid, and we regress  growth  on investment." 3 The prediction  of the aid-financed  investment
model  is that there will be a significant  coefficient  of greater  than or equal  to one in the
investment  on aid equation.  In the growth  on investment  equation,  the prediction  is that
there will be a significant  short-to-medium  run relationship  between growth  and
investment,  implying  a "reasonable"  ICOR of between  2 and 5. We do not use any other
controls,  because  the models  we are testing  are bivariate  models  -- investment  depends  on
4aid, and growth  depends  on investment.  We also do not attempt  to control  for
endogeneity  of aid or investment  -- our interest  is in whether  aid, investment,  and growth
jointly evolved  as the inventors  of the aid-financed  investment  key to growth  expected.
Table 1 shows  the results  of the investment  on aid equation,  using overseas
development  assistance  as a ratio to GDP as our definition  of "aid." The investment  to
GDP  numbers  are from Summers  and Heston 1993,  with subsequent  updates.
Table  1: Results  of  regressing  Gross  Domestic  InvestmentVGDP  on
ODAIGDP  country  by  country  in  Africa,  1965-95
Coefficient  of Investment  on  ODA  Number  of  Percent  of  Sample
countries
Total  34  100%
Positive,  significant,  and  >=1  0  0%
Positive  and  significant  8  24%
Positive  17  50%
Negative  17  50%
Negative  and  significant  12  35%
Table 1 shows  that no African  country  satisfied  the prediction  that investment  would
increase  with aid at least one for one. Eight countries  showed  a positive and significant
relationship  between  aid and investment,  but twelve  countries  showed  a negative and
significant  relationship. Table 1 is not good news for the aid-financed  investment
approach  to African  development.
Of course,  there are many statistical  difficulties  establishing  a causal relationship
between  aid and investment.  Our aim is less ambitious.  We  just want  to know if aid and
investment  evolved  the way the proponents  of the aid-financed  investment  model
predicted.  The answer  is unambiguous:  no.
To see an individual  country  illustration  of the Table 1 results, Figure 1 shows
actual  and predicted  investment  in Madagascar.  Actual  investment  stayed under  2 percent
5Chartl
Figure 1: Madagascar: Actual investment to GDP  and that predicted
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5Aof GDP.  The predicted  investment,  if aid had gone one for one into investment,  would
have reached  18 percent of GDP.
For the second  exercise,  we regress  annual  growth  -on  investment/GDP  lagged  one
year (with  a constant)  for each African  country  over 1960-95. The reader  might object
that it is unreasonable  to expect  investment  to pay off one year  to the next. We agree;  we
use annual  data  with a one year lag only because  that has been  the practice  in the aid-
financed  investment  approach." 4 We will also do a statistical  exercise  using four-year
averages.  The results from the annual  data are as follows:
Table  2: Regression  of  GDP  growth  on lagged  investment
country  by  country
Number  Percent  of
sample
Total  sample  of  African  countries  35
Positive  and  significant  w/  2<ICOR<5  2  6%
Positive  and  significant  5  14%
Positive  18  51%
Negative  17  49%
Note:  regression  includes  a constant  term
Only two African  countries  meet the condition  of a positive  and significant  relationship
with a "reasonable"  ICOR  between 2 and 5. Only five African  countries  have a positive
and significant  relationship  between  investment  and growth  of any kind in the annual
data. Half of the sample  has a negative  (though  not significant)  relationship  between
investment  and growth.
Figure  2 shows  the evolution  of actual  output in Zambia  compared  to that
predicted  by the ICOR model  with actual  Zambian  investment.  Output  would  have
reached  near $2500  in 1985  international  prices, instead  of declining  to $600. This is
assuming  an ICOR of 4, which  as we saw above is a popular  ICOR.
6inv and growth  cht
Figure 2: Zambian per capita income if all of actual investment had
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6ATable 3 shows the results of a regression of four-year average growth rates on
four-year average investment rates, lagged one period, for the sample of African
countries.
Table  3: LS  // Dependent  Variable  is GROWTH  (4 year  averages)
Included  observations  (Africa  only):  307
White  Heteroskedasticity-Consistent  Standard  Errors  &
Covariance
Variable  Coefficient  Std.  Error  t-Statistic  Prob.
C  2.782878  0.370807  7.504927  0.0000
Investment/GDP,  lag  0.044044  0.030759  1.431915  0.1532
R-squared  0.008705  Mean  dependent  var  3.259935
Adjusted  R-squared  0.005455  S.D.  dependent  var  3.792423
S.E.  of regression  3.782066  Akaike  info  criterion  2.667034
Sum  squared  resid  4362.726  Schwarz  criterion  2.691313
Log  likelihood  -843.0038  F-statistic  2.678356
Durbin-Watson  stat  2.049589  Prob(F-statistic)  0.102752
The relationship between growth and investment in Africa is still not statistically
significant with four-year averages. This echoes results in the worldwide sample, in
which lagged investment is also not significant in a panel growth regression (Blomstrom,
Lipsey, and Zejan 1996). The short-run to medium-run link from investment to growth is
simply absent.
Figure 3 shows a scatter plot of the data underlying Table 3, with lines marking
average investment and average GDP growth. We see that the off-diagonal quadrants
contain as many datapoints as the diagonal ones.  We label some particularly egregious
outliers.  Gabon in 1977-81, for example, had sharply negative GDP growth despite
lagged investment of over 35 percent of GDP.  In the other direction, Lesotho in 1973-77
had growth of nearly 15 percent with lagged investment of only 8 percent.
7Chartl
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Figure 4: Actual  growth  versus  that predicted  by the Financing  Gap model
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7  BWe can also test the aid to investment to growth links jointly. We ask how much
per capita growth would have been in each country if all aid went into investment and
investment went into growth with an ICOR of 4.  (We subtract population growth in each
country to give per capita growth.) Figure 4 gives us the answers, compared with African
countries' actual per capita growth rates. There is no apparent correlation between growth
predicted by the aid-financed investment to growth approach and the actual growth rate.
Moreover a majority of the datapoints lie below the 45% line in the graph, indicating that
actual growth fell short of predicted growth.  Countries like Guinea-Bissau, Zambia,
Zimbabwe, and Mauritania should have done well according to the aid-financed growth
model; instead they had close to zero per capita growth.
Figure 5 shows the example of Mauritania's income over time if the aid-financed
investment approach had worked. Mauritanians would have followed a trajectory much
like South Koreans if only this approach had worked; instead Mauritanians saw their per
capita income stagnate.
Sources of growth accounting
The evidence so far has demonstrated the failure of the short-run investment to
growth link. It is obvious that in the long run, physical (and human) capital play some
role in producing output. Research on East Asia suggests a large role for physical and
hurnan capital accumulation during their rapid growth (Young 1994, Krugman 1995).
The question then becomes, how big a role do physical and human capital investment
8Figure  5: Mauritania:  Gap  between  aid-financed  investment  model
and  reality
8500























8Aplay in Africa, compared to other factors? Even if they play a role, is investment the
endogenous outcome of policies?
We address the first question in Table 4. We use the data of Benhabib and Spiegel
1994 (B-S) on physical capital, human capital, labor and output. We then calculate how
much of growth is due to factor accumulation in 5 East Asian nations (the only ones in
their sample) and 25 African nations.  We see according to their sample, that East Asia
indeed had a large advantage over Africa in physical capital accumulation. Labor force
growth was about the same in the two places.  However, Africa had a large advantage
over East Asia in growth of human capital.  The three factors balance out to account for 1
percentage point of the 3.1 percentage point growth differential between East Asia and
Africa, 1965-85. This leaves 2.1 percentage points of the growth explained by "total
factor productivity growth."  Whatever TFP growth contains, the main story behind
Africa's  failure relative to East Asia's success is not factor accumulation.
We can also address the importance of factor accumulation by seeing how much
of the cross-country variation in the combined East Asia and Africa sample does factor
accumulation explain. Since output growth is the sum of TFP growth and factor growth,
we have:
Variance (output growth) = Variance (TFP growth) + Variance (Factor growth) +
2 * Covariance (TFP growth, Factor growth)
We can calculate with this formula what percentage of the variance of output is due to the
variance of factor growth in the B-S data. Neoclassical theory tells us that the covariance
term (which was 16% of total output growth variance) should be assigned to total factor
productivity.  It measures the degree to which factor accumulation responds to TFP
9Table 4: Sources of growth decomposition between East Asia and Africa, 1965-85
Rates of growth of:
All Factors
Physical  Human  of  Total Factor
Capital  Labor  capital  Production  Productivity  Output
5 East Asian Nations  8.4%  2.4%  2.2%  4.3%  2.4%  6.7%
25 Subsaharan African Nations  1.9%  2.2%  5.7%  3.3%  0.3%  3.6%
East Asia-Africa growth
difference explained by:  2.1%  0.0%  -1.2%  1.0%  2.1%  3.1%
Share of cross-country output
growth variance in East Asia +
Africa sample explained by:  24%  76%
Notes:
(1) Source for each factor's growth by country is Benhabib and Spiegel 1994
(2) We assume share of 1/3 for each factor of production.
(3) We assigned the covariance term between factor accumulation and TFP growth (16% of growth
variance) to TFP, because it is TFP-induced factor accumulation according to neoclassical theory.
East Asian Nations:  African Nations:
MALAYSIA  BOTSWANA
JAPAN  CAMEROON























9Agrowth. But even wvithout  this tenn, TFP growth's cross-country variation accounts for 60
percent of output growth's variance while factor accumulation only accounts for 24
percent.
Nehru and Dhareshwar 1993 find that capital accumulation in East Asia was not
as far ahead of Africa as B-S indicate (growth rates of 7.4 percent and 5.3 percent
respectively). However, Nehru, Swanson, and Dubey 1993 find that growth in human
capital was equal in the two places. These alterations to the Benhabib-Spiegel figures
roughly cancel out, still leaving most of the growth differential explained by total factor
productivity growth.
We did the variance decomposition in the growth accounting exercises of Nehru
and Dhareshwar 1993 and King and Levine 1994. In both, physical capital growth rate
per capita variation accounts for below 25 percent of per capita output growth variation
1960-89. We looked also at Bosworth and Collins'  1996 reporting of TFP growth and
physical and human capital accumulation for 8 regions and 3 time periods.  The variance
in factor accumulation accounts for only 20 percent of the cross-regional, cross-time
variation.
Policies, investment, andgrowth
Even the part of output growth variation explained by capital accumulation does
not necessarily imply a causal link from capital accumulation to growth.  In the
neoclassical model, as already mentioned, capital accumulation is a function of the TFP
growth rate in the steady state. An increase in TFP growth would raise both capital
growth and output growth, but there would not be a causal relation between capital
growth and output growth (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995). In models that endogenize
10TFP growth, it becomes a function of economic policies.In  endogenous growth models
that stress physical and human capital accumulation, capital growth and output growth
both respond to economic policies.  This suggests that we should look to policies more
than to investment as "key" to Africa's poor growth.
Policy differentials can take us quite far in explaining the Africa - East Asia
growth difference. Figure 6 shows that 5 indirect indicators of policy explain 2.6 of the
3.4 percentage point growth differential between East Asia and Africa. The five are
telephones per worker, fiscal surplus/GDP, the black market premium on foreign
exchange, financial depth (M2/GDP), and initial schooling.' 5 The other portion is the net
of the convergence effect (which was an advantage for Africa) and an Africa dummy
variable that measures how much of Africa's poor growth was unexplained.'6 Given the
importance of policies in explaining Africa's growth, we now turn to the question of how
aid influenced policy.
2. Aid-induced Policy Reform
What we have established so far is that the traditional aid to investment to growth
linkages underlying the aid-financed investment "key to growth" are not very robust.  On
the other hand, differences in economic policies can go a long way toward explaining
differences in countries' growth rates. This finding is encouraging, because it means that
reforms that in many cases are not technically difficult can help poor countries increase
their growth rates and accelerate poverty reduction.  Most economists now recognize the
importance of policy, and the proximate objective of development assistance has
11Figure 6: Decomposition of Growth Difference Between East Asia
and Africa by Policy Indicator
4
Source:  Easterly  and
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IIAgradually shifted from financing investment to inducing policy reform. So this section
asks: did aid-induced policy reform turn out to be the key to unlock Africa's  growth
potential?
If policy reforms have short-term costs -- perhaps focused on particular segments
of the population -- then foreign aid can potentially help reformers get launched.
Stabilization typically requires fiscal adjustments that will lead to higher taxes or lower
services for some groups. Trade liberalization will hurt firms and workers in previously
protected industries.  State enterprise reform and privatization are likely to lead to
transitional unemployment.  If a government wants to implement growth-enhancing
reforms, foreign aid can help with the adjustment costs.
Jeffrey Sachs (1994) analyzes eight major economic reform episodes in the post-
war period: Bolivia, Chile, Germany, Israel, Mexico, Poland, and Turkey.  In each case
he finds a crucial contribution of aid, though he also stresses that the government in
question committed itself to reform before large-scale aid arrived.  Sachs concludes that
the role of aid is to "help good governments to survive long enough to solve problems"
(p. 512).
On the other hand, Dani Rodrik (1996) points out that "aid can also help bad
governments to survive.  For debating purposes, one can cite at least as many cases as
Sachs does to demonstrate an association between plentiful aid and delayed reform....
One of the pieces of conventional wisdom about the Korean and Taiwanese reforms of
the 1960s is that these reforms took place in large measure because US aid, which had
been plentiful during the 1950s, was coming to an end..." (p. 31).
12Burnside and Dollar (1997) examined the relationship between aid and an index
of macroeconomic and trade policies, for 56 developing countries.  They showed first that
policies can be explained to a considerable extent by underlying country characteristics.
These characteristics included the rule of law, ethnic fractionalization (which is
associated with poor policies), or political instability (also associated with poor policies).
When they added aid to the regression equation, they found no effect of aid on the policy
index.  This finding does not refute Sachs's view that aid has contributed to reform in
certain cases.  Rather, it suggests that aid has supported governments with bad policies to
about the same extent that it has supported reforming governments. Aid-induced policy
reform turned out to be no more of a key than aid-financed investment.  Aid-induced
reform was not the key because aid did not, on average, induce reform.
We can get some insight into the relationship between aid and policy by looking
at individual country cases.  Zarnbia is a good example of Dani Rodrik's critique that aid
can enable governments to delay reforms.  Policies in Zambia were poor and getting
poorer throughout the 1970-93 period, yet the amount of aid that the country received
rose continuously, reaching 11% of real GDP by the early 1990s (Figure 7). The Bank
and the Fund gave Zambia received 18 adjustment loans over this period.  One could
argue that this large amount of assistance sustained a poor policy regime.
For each Zambia, however, there is a Ghana.  Ghana received very little aid
during the period it had bad policies, while donor support has been strong since it
reformed (Figure 8).  Case studies of Ghana generally find that foreign financing helped
consolidate a good reform program. In the Burnside-Dollar sample of 56 countries, these
different experiences cancel out: aid and policy are virtually uncorrelated.  When they
13Figure  7. Zambia:  Aid and Policy
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13Bintroduced other variables that are likely to affect policy into the equation, there was still
no relationship between aid and policy.
One obvious response to the problem that finance may as well delay reform as
encourage it, is to make assistance conditional on policy reform. The International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank intend to give financial support only as
governments carry out reform measures.  These conditional flows are only a small part
of official flows; nevertheless, other donors pay attention to progress with structural
adjustment programs in making their decisions about aid allocations.  In the 1980s there
was great hope that making a large fraction of development assistance conditional on
policy reform would spur growth and poverty reduction throughout the developing
world.
There are a number of reasons, however, why conditionality failed to be the key
that would yield permanent improvements in policy.  First, conditionality is inherently
hard to monitor.  Take, for example, a condition that seems relatively simple: that the
fiscal deficit not exceed a certain level.  Government policy influences the fiscal deficit,
but shocks not under the government's control also affect it. A country may miss an
agreed fiscal target because of a shock.  We x'ould want them to, because a target that is
"good policy" in one environment becomes "poor policy" in an altered environment.
Thus, whether or not a country has met a policy target requires an element of subjective
judgment.  The subjectivity involved becomes more acute as the reforms become more
complex institutionally.
The second problem with conditionality is that it only has a force during the life
of the adjustment program. A government in financial difficulty may agree to certain
14reforms and carry them out in order to obtain conditional resources.  If there is no strong
commitment to these reforms, then the government can reverse them at the end of the
adjustment program.  From a theoretical point of view, it seems unlikely that conditional
aid could induce permanent policy change if there is not a domestic constituency for
reform.
The third and probably most serious problem with conditionality concerns the
incentives within donor agencies.  Governments set up donor agencies to provide
financial assistance. These agencies want to disburse funds. The monitoring of policy
reform requires some subjective judgment. So the likely outcome is that the donors will
find that govermnents are making a good effort -- even where there is little objective
progress -- and disburse their funds.  The Economist describes this kind of donor
behavior as follows:
Over  the past  few years  Kenya  has  performed  a curious  mating  ritual with its aid donors. The
steps are:  one, Kenya  wins its yearly  pledges  of foreign  aid. Two,  the government  begins  to
misbehave,  backtracking  on economic  reform and  behaving  in an authoritarian  manner. Three, a
new meeting of donor countries  looms  with exasperated  foreign  governments  preparing  their
sharp  rebukes. Four,  Kenya  pulls a placatory  rabbit  out of the hat. Five, the donors  are mollified
and the aid is pledged. The  whole  dance  then starts  again.  (August 19, 1995)
There is a large empirical literature on structural adjustment lending and its effect
on policies [see e.g. Mosley (1987), Mosley et al. (1995), and Thomas (1991)].  These
review draw primarily on case studies. These reviews conclude that conditionality to
promote reform is ineffective in countries in which there is no strong local movement in
that direction.  Mosley et al., for example, conclude that in Africa structural adjustment
lending of the World Bank affected the policies of recipients "a little, but not as much as
the Bank hoped."  In their view the main problem with conditionality was that the World
Bank had strong incentives to disburse funds, and thus was inclined to see a good effort
15even where there was none.  In their sarnple of adjustment loans, governments carried out
only 53% of loan conditionalities.  Nevertheless, almost all of these adjustment loans
disbursed.
The lesson of the case study literature is that the existence of a conditional loan in
no way ensures that governments will reform. Recall that the Fund  and the Bank gave
Zambia 18 conditional  loans during the period depicted in Figure 7. Collier (1997) gives the
example of Kenya, in which the World Bank provided aid to support policy reforms in
the agricultural sector. However, the Bank financed the identical reforms five separate
times, and each time the government did not do the reforms or subsequently reversed
them.  Yet all of these adjustment loans disbursed.
At the same time, adjustment lending has successfully supported many reform
programs.  Among the cases cited by Sachs in which foreign aid helped reforming
government, several were the recipients of adjustment loans from the IMF and the World
Bank.  In her case studies of aid effectiveness in Latin America, Cecilia Lopez (1997)
singles out Bolivia as a case in which adjustment lending provided finance to a
determined reforming government.  Bolivia is a good example of a country in which
foreign assistance increased in lock-step with policy reforms (Figure 9).  Much of this
increase in finance came through adjustment loans. Gustav Ranis'  1995 review of
policy-based lending concluded that: "the lending cum conditionality process works well
only when local polities have decided, largely on their own, possibly with outside
technical help, to address their reform needs, effect certain policy changes sequentially,
and approach the international community for financial help in getting there."
16Figure 9. Bolivia: Aid and Policy
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16AIn its own internal reviews the World Bank has come to the same conclusion
reached by these outside studies, that strong domestic support of the reform program is
necessary if adjustment lending is to succeed. The Operations Evaluation Department
(OED) of the World Bank is an independent office that judges ex-post the success or
failure of all loans. For adjustment loans, it examines whether governments have actually
reformed. OED has found that about one-third of adjustment loans fail to achieve the
expected reforms. It has identified "borrower ownership" or commitment as a key factor
in successful adjustment (World Bank, 1997).
In a recent study Dollar and Svensson (1998) investigated underlying
determinants or indicators of "ownership" of successful reform programs.  They had a
large sample of World Bank adjustment loans (105 cases in which reforms were
successfully carried out, and 55 cases in which reforms were not carried out). They
found a number of political-institutional features clearly associated with successful
reform programs.  In particular, the probability of success of reform depended on
whether the government was an elected one and on how long it had been in power.
Other things equal, a newly elected government that signed an adjustment program had a
95% probability of success, compared to only 65% for an authoritarian government that
had been in power 12 years or longer (Figure 10). The political-economy variables
successfully predicted the outcome of 75% of adjustment loans. Many of the failed
adjustment loans were predictable in that the environments into which the Bank made
the loans were not conducive to reform.
This study also examined factors under the control of the World Bank: the size of
the loan, the number of conditions, the amount of resources used to prepare the loan, and
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~~~~~~~~~17  Pthe amount of resources devoted to analytical work in the four years prior to the
adjustment loan. It found that these "Bank effort" variables are remarkably similar on
average for successful and failed adjustment programs.  When they combined all the
variables in a multivariate analysis of success and failure of adjustment programs, what
emerged was that successful reform depends on institutional-political characteristics of
countries.  The Bank-related variables have no significant relationship with reform
outcome.
In the past, World Bank behavior did not sufficiently take into account that the
success or failure of reform is to a large extent outside its control. Zambia provides a
case in point: in the 1980s the World Bank approved four structural adjustment loans for
Zambia, totaling $212 million.  These loans disbursed almost fully (the Bank canceled
less than 2% of the committed amount).  After loan completion, the Operations
Evaluation Department rated three out of the four as failures. The government did not
satisfactorily implement the reforms supported by these loans.  The Dollar-Svensson
results suggest that this outcome was largely predictable.  Zambia at that time did not
have conditions conducive to reform.  A non-democratic govermnent had been in power
for a long time, and such a government is not a likely reformer.  It may have been worth
taking a chance on the first adjustment loan. But it is easy to conclude in retrospect that a
succession of policy-based loans for Zambia was not a good use of resources.
What these different studies suggest is that countries' own institutional and
political features determine policy reform.  Foreign finance -- even conditional finance --
is not likely to generate a reform program in a country in which there is no domestic
constituency for reform.  Development economists increasingly recognize this "borrower
18ownership" of the reform program as a prerequisite for success. Once a serious reform
program has started in a country, then financial assistance can be useful to help
consolidate it.
3. Policies  Plus Money
One of the main themes of our paper is that good policies are more important than
money.  With bad policies, aid and investment do not generate many results.  Good
policy, on the other hand, will tend to attract money and use it well.  However, we do not
want to go too far in emphasizing the primacy of policy over finance.  The main point
that we want to make in this section is that the combination of good policy and finance is
very powerful.  First, we are going to show that the combination of good policy and a
high level of private investment is strongly correlated with growth.  Then we are going to
examine in more detail the determinants of private investment and in particular argue that
in a good policy environment foreign aid crowds in private investment.  The conclusion
that emerges from this analysis is that large financial assistance is only useful to poor
countries after they have made substantial progress with policy reform. Once they have
reached that stage, however, the money is quite important.
We showed in section 1 that total investment is not a very good predictor of
growth.  Furthermore, Easterly and Rebelo (1993) have shown that public investment has
no robust relationship at all with growth.  Pritchett (1996) argues that much public
investment does not actually translate into increases in physical capital. Private
investment, on the other hand, does have some relationship.  Table 5 shows a panel
regression of growth on private investment as a share of GDP, an index of economic
19Table 5.  Growth, Investment, and Policy
Time dimension: six four-year periods: 1970-73 to 1990-93
Countries: 49
Dependent variable:  Growth rate of per capita GNP
Method  (1)  (2)  (3)
OLS  OLS  2SLS
#obs  198  198  194
Constant  2.57  3.25  2.76
_________________  (0.96)  (1.23)  (1.03)
Private Investment  0.14  0.07  -0.02
(2.94)  (1.24)  (0.13)
Policy Index  0.78  0.27  0.21
________________  (5.57)  (1.22)  (0.74)
Initial Income  -0.65  -0.63  -0.42
(1.74)  (1.71)  (0.98)
Investment x Policy  0.03  0.04
--  (2.54)  (1.95)
R'  .40  .41  .40
Adj: R2 .37  .38  .37
Note: t-statistics  (in parentheses)  have  been calculated  with  White's
heteroskedasticity-consistent  standard  errors,  for all regressions  in  the paper.
19Apolicy, and initial income.  The index of economic policy includes openness as measured
by Sachs and Warner (1995), inflation, the budget surplus, and a measure of institutional
quality (rule of law, absence of corruption) from Knack and Keefer (1995).  There are a
number of problems with interpreting this regression that we will return to: for the
moment treat it as telling us about partial correlations. There is a strong partial
correlation between private investment and growth, after controlling for policy and initial
income.  But if we interact policy and private investment (regression 2), the interactive
term has more statistical significance than either private investment alone or policy alone.
Rapid growth is associated with the combination of good policies and high private
investment.
The reason that we have to be careful interpreting this regression is that it may be
that growth causes private investment, rather than vice versa.  Furthermore, we will show
later in this section that good policy increases private investment; that is, the latter
variable is clearly endogenous.  In the third column we address these problems by
instrumenting for private investment and for private investment interacted with policy.
The results are qualitatively the same as the OLS regression. An exogenous change in
private investment would have no effect on growth in a country in which policies are very
poor and only a modest effect in the developing country of average policy. This reaffinms
the conclusion of our first section that investment by itself is no magic key for
development.
In a good policy environment, on the other hand, an exogenous increase in private
investment has a fairly strong effect. An increase in private investment of 6 percentage
points of GDP (the standard deviation in this sample) would increase growth by 0.6
20percentage  points. Hence,  it is only when interacted  with good policy  that we find a
positive and significant  effect  of investment.
What can developing  countries  and  their supporters  do to increase  private
investment  in a good policy  framework? To address  this question  we attempted  to
explain private  investment  as a function  of
initial income  level;





This approach  is consistent  with the new growth  literature,  in which  private accumulation
is a function  of initial conditions  and  the incentive  regime.
The basic effort  to explain differences  in private  investment  across  countries  and
over time is fairly successful  (Table  6). High levels  of private investment  are associated
witi good economic  policy,  low levels of government  consumption,  and political
stability. (Since economic  policy  enters positively  both this equation  and the growth
equation  with private investment  included,  policies  affect  growth  both through  the
accumulation  of capital  and through  the efficiency  of capital.)
It is interesting  that initial income  appears  with a large positive  coefficient. In
growth  regressions  we typically  find that, other  things  equal,  poor countries  grow faster.
In this private investment  equation,  other  things equal,  richer countries  have higher
21investmnent. This finding suggests that low-income countries have trouble generating
savings or attracting foreign investment even after they have put good policies (including
secure rule of law) into place.  It is also noteworthy that aid enters with an insignificant
coefficient in the private investment equation.
The picture changes if we interact aid with the economic policy index.  There is a
positive coefficient on this interactive term, and a negative one on aid squared interacted
with the policy index. This is similar to what Bumside and Dollar found concerning aid,
policies, and growth: foreign aid leads to higher private investment in an environment of
good policies, but not in an environment of poor policies.  The negative coefficient on the
quadratic term means that there are diminishing returns to aid: the marginal impact of aid
declines and becomes negative at high volumes. The measurement of this curvature is
not very precise as it depends on a few large outliers in the aid times policy dimension.  If
we drop these outliers, the positive coefficient on the aid times policy term remains
strongly positive (regression 3). Because of concerns about the endogeneity of aid, we
repeat these three regressions using instruments for aid and the interactive terms
(regressions 4-6).
The basic story remains the same in these instrumented regressions.  Regression 6
says that the interaction of aid and good policy has much more explanatory power than
either variable alone. The effect of foreign aid on private investment depends on the
quality of economic policies.  In a good policy environment, 1 percent of GDP in aid
crowds in 1.9 percentage points of private investment; in a poor policy environment aid
crowds out private investment (Figure 11).
22Figure 11.  Marginal Impact  on Private Investment  of 1% of
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22AThese results  help explain  why the growth  effect  of aid depends  so critically  on
economic  policies. It appears  that when a poor country  puts good policies  into place,
private investors-both domestic  and foreign-are  uncertain  as to the reliability  of the
reform. If there is fear of reversal,  then investors  will hold back. Also, even  with good
management,  impediments  such as weak  infrastructure  hamper  low-income  countries. In
this environment  foreign  aid to a reforming  government  may improve  the environment
for private investment-both by creating  confidence  in the reform  program and by
helping ease  infrastructure  bottlenecks.  In a poor policy  environment,  on the other  hand,
aid financing  crowds  out private  investment,  probably  by increasing  the government's
capacity  to undertake  projects  that compete  with the private sector.
The positive  coefficient  on the interactive  term has a second,  equally  important
interpretation:  the impact  of policy  reform  depends  on the amount  of assistance  that a
poor country  is receiving. Regression  6 indicates  that a 1 unit increase  in the policy  index
has a negligible  impact  on private investment  if aid equals  zero. (Burnside  and Dollar
show  that there is still some  modest  growth  effect,  which  presumably  comes from more
efficient  use of existing  capital stock.) With  aid equal  to 2 percent  of real PPP GDP, on
the other hand,  the same  policy  reform  would  increase  private  investment  by 1.4
percentage  points. This response  of private investors  is one reason  why  the growth  effect
of reform  is greater  when a poor country  is receiving  some  foreign  aid.
4. Conclusion
Our study  of aid, investment,  and policies  in Africa leads  to four  principal
conclusions:
/  23*  The traditional aid-investment-growth linkages are not very robust.  Aid does
not necessarily finance investment and investment does not necessarily
promote growth.
*  Differences in economic policies can explain much of the difference in
growth performances. Poor quality of public services, closed trade regimes,
financial repression, and macroeconomic mismanagement explain Africa's
poor record.
*  Foreign aid cannot easily promote lasting policy reform in countries in which
there is no strong domestic movement in that direction.  Country "ownership"
of reforms is more important than donor conditionality.
*  These three conclusions imply that societies themselves must take the lead in
putting growth-enhancing policies into place.  When this happens, foreign aid
can play a powerful supporting role, bringing ideas, technical assistance, and
money.  The combination of private investment, good policies, and foreign
aid is quite powerful.
So where do we stand on the search for the key in Africa?  The failure of past
keys induces us to be cautious on claims for a new key. But even if aid-cum-private
investment-cum-policy reform falls short of being the one and only key to growth,
disbursing aid into good policy environments would be an improvement on current
practice.
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